๐ Introduction
As mentioned in the MTA-STS article, SMTP over TLS is vulnerable to downgrade and MITM attacks. MTA-STS improves security but still relies on HTTPS, CA certificates, and DNS TXT records, which may be intercepted or manipulated.
For environments requiring even stronger, cryptographically verifiable security, there is DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities).
DANE uses DNSSEC to authenticate TLS certificates directly from DNS records.
๐ It binds your TLS certificate to DNS
๐ It is cryptographically protected by DNSSEC
๐ MITM and certificate replacement become impossible
๐ What Is DANE?
DANE is a protocol that uses DNSSEC-signed TLSA records to authenticate TLS certificates.
It ensures:
- MX records cannot be spoofed
- TLS certificates cannot be replaced
- Attackers cannot downgrade encryption
- Only certificates matching the TLSA record are accepted
Unlike MTA-STS, DANE does not rely on certificate authorities.
You can even use a self-signed certificate if it matches the TLSA record.
๐งฉ Requirements for DANE
1๏ธโฃ DNSSEC must be enabled
Absolutely mandatory.
2๏ธโฃ The MX hostname must also use DNSSEC
Example:
example.com MX 10 mail.example.com
mail.example.com A 192.168.1.10
Both labels must be DNSSEC-signed.
3๏ธโฃ TLSA records must be published
Example:
_25._tcp.mail.example.com. TLSA 3 1 1 1A2B3C4D...
๐ How DANE Works (SMTP Example)
- Sender validates MX via DNSSEC
- Sender fetches TLSA via DNSSEC
- TLS handshake begins
- TLS certificate is compared to TLSA
- If mismatch โ reject
- If match โ accept and deliver
DANE is strict: if TLSA exists, it must validate.
๐ MTA-STS vs DANE Comparison
| Feature | MTA-STS | DANE |
|---|---|---|
| Requires DNSSEC | No | Yes |
| Policy source | HTTPS | DNSSEC-signed TLSA |
| MITM protection | High | Very high |
| Certificate requirements | Public CA only | Self-signed OK |
| Deployment difficulty | Low | High |
| Supported by Google/Microsoft | Yes | No |
Conclusion:
- DANE = Highest security
- MTA-STS = Most widely supported
Combined together:
๐ DANE (if available) + MTA-STS (fallback) = Best practice
๐ง TLSA Record Example
_25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA 3 1 1 (
9A1CF293716A5C31A021341F89A91B77F17C93A2F4F6F7C6A2F9D4024B6EAE1D
)
Description:
3โ DANE-EE (End-Entity certificate)1โ Cert (entire certificate)1โ SHA-256- Last line โ Fingerprint
๐ข Who Supports DANE?
| MTA | Support |
|---|---|
| Postfix | โ Yes |
| Exim | โ Yes |
| OpenSMTPD | โ Yes |
| Gmail | โ No |
| Microsoft 365 | โ No |
DANE is widely used by EU governments, financial institutions, and high-security environments.
๐ฏ Conclusion
DANE provides the strongest email transport security available today by combining:
- DNSSEC integrity
- TLS certificate pinning
- Full MITM protection
Although deployment requires DNSSEC and additional operational effort, it provides unmatched protection.
If your organization manages its own Postfix/Dovecot infrastructure and can deploy DNSSEC, DANE combined with MTA-STS delivers the highest security posture for email transport.